Interview: ‘To compensate for the US military support to Ukraine, Europe should use the frozen assets of the Russians,’ Susann Worschech

- In eastern Germany, the far-right Alternative for Germany (AfD) won in the lands of the former GDR. In the rest of the country, the CDU/CSU won. Why, after 35 years of unification, is the country still divided, and the east votes for extreme pro-Russian parties?

- We have a conservative shift in Germany, as the recent elections proved. But the eastern part also has the problem of the legacy of the GDR and 30 years of transformation. In this part of the country, there is a low level of trust in institutions, but rather trust in informal networks. There is also a huge disappointment with the changes after 1989. Although most people are living well financially, the post-socialist transformation is not perceived as having gone well. German political institutions and culture remain quite alien to many in the east.

There is a lack of civic education about political and democratic processes. The problem goes back to the GDR and the 1990s. Taken together, we can see that although living conditions in eastern Germany are not as bad, the welfare state exists as in the western part, at the same time there are regional differences in living standards. This results in a rejection of “Western” democratic parties and a high interest in non-democratic and pro-Russian forces. 

- CDU leader Friedrich Merz said he wants to form a coalition government by Easter, April 20. How realistic is this? Is Chancellor Olaf Scholz's SPD the most likely coalition partner?

- I don't think Scholz will be part of the next government. But the Social Democrats are now the only coalition partner of the Conservatives, unless the Conservatives themselves change their attitude and want to have a coalition with the AfD, which they had previously ruled out. If the CDU keeps its promise, it will remain in the democratic spectrum. Then there will be a coalition with the SPD. So, the Social Democrats will be part of the next government, and they can raise the price for participation in the coalition.

Another question is whether we can trust Merz's promise that he will not enter into a coalition with the AfD and will not cooperate with the far right. He promised this before the election, but then he cooperated with them in one parliamentary initiative. It had no practical results - it was just a so-called parliamentary initiative to make a statement. But they cooperated, and this initiative would not have been successful without the votes of the AfD. Many people are now reluctant to trust Merz and the CDU because of this.

- What are Merz's main internal and external challenges, and how does he intend to address them?

- The biggest challenge for the next government is to unite Europe and work on this with our partners, in particular France, Poland and, of course, Ukraine, to strengthen the European position and restore peace in Europe.

The EU's position on the issue of establishing a fair, just and sustainable peace in Ukraine will be relevant. This is related to Europe's defense capability, the level and possibilities of Germany's cooperation with European partners, and the organization of a common European voice. This is the biggest foreign policy challenge the new government will face.

The problem is that German society does not realize and is therefore not ready for these huge steps that we have to take in defense and foreign policy. A significant part of society and the country still lives in the 1990s and early 2000s, when it seemed that there was “eternal peace” in Europe, that there would be no enemies, and no country would ever challenge our peaceful life. But it is obvious that we have to change our attitude. Conservatives are mostly aware that the situation is different now, that Russia poses a great threat to European peace and stability. And the biggest challenge is to restore stability and unity in Europe.

There are big internal challenges - migration was an important topic in the election campaigns of almost every party in Germany. I would reluctantly agree that it is the biggest challenge. I think the media and far-right parties have blown it out of proportion. The real issues are social inequality, the integration of people coming to Germany, the shortcomings in the education system and the economy.

One of the problems is that it is easy to switch people's attention to migration issues. The biggest challenge is that people feel that there is too much inequality in society and are afraid of too much change. The new government must address this issue and not leave it to right-wing extremists.

- How does Merz see the fight against security challenges at the EU level? To what extent do his views coincide with those of the leaders of other major European countries such as France, Italy, Poland, and Spain?

- Merz emphasized his readiness to support Ukraine more strongly than, for example, Scholz. He was even allegedly ready to send Taurus missiles. But these statements were made last November as part of the election campaign. I am not entirely sure whether he was honest with his promise to send Taurus.

It seems that Merz understands better than Scholz the importance of a united Europe and good, close cooperation with European partners in all areas, better understands Franco-German and German-Polish cooperation. We will see which country he will visit first after being elected chancellor. How will relations with our closest partners in Europe develop? I hope they will be better than under Scholz, who did not feel what Germany needed in terms of the narratives that were prevalent, particularly in Central and Eastern Europe.

I am not sure that Merz will be more sensitive to Eastern European issues. I only hope so. But it will be important for him to hear Polish, Baltic, and Ukrainian voices for the sake of uniting Europe and strengthening the European position.

- How might Merz's relationship with U.S. President Donald Trump look like, and how does he see the prospect of increasing German defense spending, EU security reforms, and increased spending on European aid to Ukraine?

- This will depend on the situation in European politics. He is interested in strengthening the EU's voice against the United States. At the moment, it is quite difficult for everyone to cooperate with the United States because it is difficult to predict, especially after Trump's attack on the Ukrainian president, which was the worst moment for everyone.

There are people in the CDU who have already tried to establish contact and build trust with Trump. But building bridges with Washington is becoming more and more difficult every day, because we see these contradictory positions and actions regarding Ukraine. It is difficult to assess them and predict their next steps. But trust and reliability are the foundation of diplomacy and friendship.

German-American friendship and close transatlantic cooperation have been part of the CDU's policy for many decades. It is one of their basic narratives to maintain this friendship and close cooperation. But they have doubts about the position of the Trump administration.

Merz will try to keep his distance and find out in which parts, on which positions he can cooperate with Trump. What issues should be left out of the scope of dialogue and cooperation.

Germany depends on good relations with the United States, regardless of who is in the White House. But it will be a very difficult balance between maintaining close ties and friendship and at the same time realizing that we can no longer trust each other. We are on the eve of a new era, dealing with an authoritarian coup d'état in the most important Western democracy. This is the end of reliability.

- Could Europe and Germany, including without the United States, provide military assistance to Ukraine if Trump stops American aid?

- It would be difficult because the US was the largest donor not only in terms of military but also humanitarian support. The EU is a strong and large donor and can support a lot, but to really compensate for the US support, we need powerful and bold steps. For example, we need to use all the Russian funds frozen in the EU. To use this Russian money not only as collateral for interest, but as frozen assets themselves. In this way, the EU could support Ukraine and compensate for the costs.

Merz's task will be to find opportunities and tools to compensate for this. This also requires a critical look at the past. We would not be in the position we are in today if the EU had supported Ukraine strongly in the military and humanitarian spheres from the beginning. If we had been discussing tanks and Taurus in the spring of 2022, not a year or a year and a half later. Maybe we would not be in this situation today.

I am not sure that it is clear to Merz and the CDU that we should have helped much more before, and that we have to learn from what we did not do in the first and second years of the war.

- Merz has begun negotiations with the SPD to approve a €200 billion defense special fund. The far right and left in the new Bundestag have a minority to block this. Will they question Berlin's continued military aid to Kyiv?

- The far right and far left not only question, but strongly oppose support for Ukraine. They have a clear pro-Russian position and are trying to undermine support for Kyiv. This situation did not begin now, not even in 2022, but in 2014, when the extreme left and right parties, as well as some social democrats and some conservatives, were against or hesitant to support Ukraine.

Therefore, it is important that Chancellor Merz cooperate not only with the Social Democrats, but also with the Greens in creating new instruments for financial, military, and humanitarian aid to Ukraine. So that the party differences that we sometimes see do not concern assistance to Kyiv. Because the Conservatives and the Greens are more or less on the same page, and they are willing to support Ukraine. It would be important for them to be open to cooperation with each other.

- What is Merz's general attitude towards Ukraine and Russia? What kind of policy can we expect from him? Will he increase his support for Ukraine compared to Scholz?

- Merz visited Kyiv twice during the invasion and tried to emphasize that he is on the side of Ukrainians, that he wants to support Ukraine, and that he understands the Ukrainian struggle for freedom.

But he is also among those in the CDU who once supported, for example, Nord Stream 2. He also talked about “welfare tourism” of Ukrainian refugees in 2022, dismissive of those who came here to escape Russian aggression. When he said that he would deliver the Taurus in the fall of 2024, I'm not sure whether we can call it a drill or part of the election campaign. But there are still those in the CDU, as well as in the SPD, who would prefer a friendlier attitude toward Russia, and who are still not as supportive of Ukraine as they should be.

It will be important for Merz to unite his own party behind a position of strong support for Kyiv, and to communicate this to the public. This is not the most important aspect of his political ambitions. There are domestic issues that seem more important to him, such as migration. In its election manifesto, the CDU stated that it would reach the NATO target of 2%, strengthen the Bundeswehr and the defense industry, and create a contact group on Ukraine with Poland, France, and the UK. We will see what he can achieve.

It is also important who will become the head of the Foreign Ministry. I can imagine that it will be someone from the Social Democrats who will take this position in the coalition. It could be Boris Pistorius, and that would be great.

Before the election, Merz said that he would strongly help Kyiv, including with military assistance. Before the election, he said he would give missiles. After the election, we didn't hear him say that anymore. I'm afraid that in a coalition with the Social Democrats, he will again be reluctant to talk about this, because he will have an argument to say that he would like to send missiles to Kyiv, but the Social Democrats are against it, so it is impossible in this coalition.

I hope this will not happen and that the CDU's learning process has been successful in making Ukraine a priority and helping to achieve a just and sustainable peace in Europe.

- How will Berlin's attitude to Ukraine's membership in NATO and the EU change with Merz? Can we expect European integration to accelerate?

- It depends on how strong the EU will be in the coming months, and whether Merz will contribute to its strengthening. Ukraine's European integration is still a priority for Germany and the EU. The advantage here is that Merz and the head of the European Commission, Ursula von der Leyen, are members of the CDU. They know each other and can together increase support for this position. But it all depends on how united Europe will be able to speak with one voice, and whether Merz will be smart enough to bring the voices of Germans, Poles, French, and Spaniards together to support European integration.

The question of whether European integration can be accelerated is a complicated one, because it also depends on Ukrainian reforms and integration negotiations that Ukraine has to implement. This will be a long process, but it is important that the implementation of the EU legal framework into the Ukrainian legal system has the necessary tools, that there are mechanisms to resolve difficult situations, as in the case of Polish farmers or other controversial issues. We need to discuss this at the European level.

When it comes to NATO membership, it is much more complicated, because here Germany is very dependent on the United States and its support for European defense. Merz is not against Ukraine's membership in the Alliance, he even advocated for it, but he will not risk losing US support for NATO. With the Trump administration's new stance against Ukraine's membership, things will get more complicated. The West has lost its only voice.

It would be good and a great support for NATO if Ukraine were in the Alliance. Everyone knows that it is the most experienced army in the world today, and we would need this knowledge and active cooperation with Kyiv for our own security in Europe. But I am not sure that the next government has such a clear understanding.

- What would be the role of Germany in rebuilding Ukraine under a CDU/CSU government?

- Germany, and not only the conservative government, is in favor of providing technical and humanitarian assistance to Kyiv. Berlin is interested in playing an important role in Ukraine's reconstruction. In some ways, Germany is even more focused on rebuilding than on how to establish a just and sustainable peace - it's a certain political culture or heritage. 

In Germany, there is a preference for recovery and reconstruction rather than engaging in difficult debates and decisions about how to achieve a lasting peace, although it is obvious that the latter should come before the former.

However, reconstruction is a topic in which the CDU is interested. The party system in Germany is characterized by the fact that each party has a political foundation that acts as a think tank on its behalf. The political foundation associated with the CDU is the Konrad Adenauer Foundation. They are active in supporting Ukraine, in organizing discussions and reports on the recovery process. So, they are involved and active in this.

We can expect that the next CDU-led government will support Ukraine's recovery, particularly in technical terms, but also when it comes to models of cooperation in city partnerships, for example.

Of course, German industry is interested in expanding its corporations, so German businesses will start cooperating with Ukrainian ones to work on energy infrastructure, weapons production, and other areas.

It is good that business in Germany is looking to the conservative government to support their ambitions for international cooperation. Therefore, when it comes to recovery, we can expect fair and large participation of the Germans.

- You mentioned the Taurus. How likely is it that these missiles will be delivered to Ukraine, when, how many, and what is the obstacle, apart from possible opposition from the Social Democrats?

- The only obstacle is political. I do not hope that the next government will send these missiles for one reason: the CDU had a chance to put forward a parliamentary initiative to send missiles since the old coalition collapsed last fall. And we have not seen any initiative to reach an agreement with the Liberals and Greens to send Taurus, or at least to demand it. 

Ultimately, this is the chancellor's decision. If he does not agree, the missiles will not be sent. But it would be a very strong sign from the CDU to put pressure on Chancellor Scholz. But I haven't seen any real initiatives from Merz, so I'm skeptical about whether his government will be able to change this debate. In particular, by trying to cooperate in a coalition with the Social Democrats, who are categorically against sending missiles.

A few days ago, there was a discussion when well-known conservatives said that it was time to teach Ukrainians how to operate Taurus. But I think it was just rhetoric. I don't expect Merz to be so bold and risk his coalition with the SPD to send these missiles. He has enough reasons to say, “I wanted to send them, but unfortunately I can't because the Social Democrats are against it.”

- How does Merz feel about sending German troops along with French and British troops to Ukraine if the war is frozen?

- This is a sensitive discussion in Germany. The majority of Germans categorically reject this idea. Previously, the conservatives said they were ready to support peace in Ukraine by any means necessary, but before the election they tried to avoid this issue. Merz even attacked our foreign minister, Annalena Baerbock, when she said that German soldiers could defend peace in Ukraine.

To be honest, we are not ready for this. We are now actively working to send 5,000 Bundeswehr soldiers to Lithuania, where one of the deployment headquarters is waiting for them. It was difficult to accomplish this, not just to be there and show some NATO strength. It took us five years to do this. So even if Merz had agreed to send troops to Ukraine, it would have been a very difficult task, because Germany is not used to sending troops quickly to where they are needed. I'm not sure if the Bundeswehr is even ready for any kind of combat.

- How does Merz see the defense of Europe without the United States in the face of a possible Russian hybrid or full-scale aggression against one of the Baltic states in a few years?

- In recent weeks, when Trump made his statements, there was a great awakening in German politics. Unfortunately, even Merz and the CDU only felt the awakening the day it became clear that Trump would return to the White House.

The future government, or people like Merz and his conservatives, and most other parties and their leaders, are not very prepared for this. In its election manifesto, the CDU said that the EU should also become a “security union.” As right as that sounds - especially after the US has made it clear that it is no longer interested in a genuine peace for Ukraine - I have my doubts about whether the Merz government can muster the necessary strength to do so, and whether there is a roadmap for this effort.

Obviously, we in Germany and Europe need to strengthen our defense, increase military spending and the number of troops. There is a certain willingness to make these reforms, which we have not done for many years, but we are doing it very slowly and not in full.

Even if we increase military funding quickly, the presence of US troops is still important for Europe and Germany in particular. It is impossible to compensate for their lack in a day or even a year.

We are well aware of this dependence. European leaders see the need for reforms, for more independence and for a stronger Europe, but there are many obstacles, not only in terms of funding. It's also a matter of using the same educational standards, the same weapons and ammunition. Therefore, uniting everything is also a huge task. Everyone sees its relevance, but there is still no strategy on how to do it quickly. 

We are not at all prepared for the worst-case scenario - a Russian invasion of the Baltic states - either materially or mentally.